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Abstract 
The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is 
certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is 
also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent 
philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to 
have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical 
views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and 
describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been 
classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these 
positions than previously thought. 
 
1. Introduction 
It certainly seems to us that we inhabit a world full of coloured objects – we see 
grass as green, the sky as blue and ripe tomatoes as red. However, this common-
sense view has been challenged by scientists and philosophers, at least since the 
17th century, when Galileo said: 
I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as 
the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the 
consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities 
would be wiped away and annihilated. (1957 (1623): 274) 
Descartes, Newton, Boyle, Young, Maxwell and Helmholtz all agreed: it is a 
mistake to think that the objects around us have colour properties. This view is 
called eliminativism, and it has remained the dominant position amongst scientists 
working on colour vision. (Palmer 1999; Zeki 1983; Land 1983; Kuehni 1997; 
Cosmides and Tooby 1995) Eliminativists are motivated by the idea that our 
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common-sense view of colour cannot be accommodated within our scientific world 
view. Philosophers who defend this position include Averill (2005), Boghossian 
and Velleman (1989/1997), Hardin (1988), Mackie (1976), Maund (1995), Pautz 
(2006) and Strawson (1989).1 
2. Our Common-Sense Conception of Colour 
Malebranche’s characterisation of Augustine’s view of colour goes some way 
towards capturing our common-sense conception: colour is defined as ‘a quality 
that is spread out on the surface of bodies’. (Malebranche c.1680-90: 6.68) More 
recently, the phrase ‘colour-as-we-see-it’ has been proposed as a way of describing 
our common-sense conception of colour (Mackie 1976). This is an intuitive idea but 
difficult to describe in a sufficiently comprehensive way.2 So, let me try and make 
it more precise. The following ideas seem to be involved: 
(1) Colours are properties that are experienced by conscious beings visually – they 
cannot be fully appreciated in any non-visual way: ‘colours are visibilia or they 
are nothing’ (Strawson 2011: 56). 
(2) Colours are objective properties that objects possess regardless of their being 
observed. In other words, they are mind-independent properties. 
(3) At least in standard cases, the colour of an object is causally involved in our 
seeing that object as having the relevant colour property. 
(4) We can know the intrinsic nature of colours just by looking at them and 
experiencing them. Mark Johnston calls this ‘Revelation’ (Johnston 
1992/1997).3 
(5) Colour properties demonstrate what Adam Pautz has called ‘exclusion’ (Pautz 
2006). In other words, if an object is, say, unique green all over, it cannot be 
unique red all over at the same time.4 
3. Versions of Eliminativism 
According to the eliminativist, we discover what kinds of properties objects do (or 
do not) possess through scientific investigation – and scientific investigation has 
revealed that objects do not possess properties that meet the criteria above. In other 
words, physical objects do not possess colour properties understood according to 
our common-sense conception. The properties of objects that are causally involved 
in colour vision are those properties that determine the specific wavelengths of light 
that reach our eyes.5 (See Hardin 1988 and Byrne and Hilbert 1997b for an 
introduction to the science of colour vision.) 
Of course, eliminativists do not deny the existence of colour experiences; they are 
only eliminativists about colours as properties of physical objects. Many hold colour 
to be a mental property of some description: 
Far from being a physical property of objects, color is a mental property – a useful 
invention that specialized circuitry computes in our minds and then “projects 
Colour 
3 
 
onto” our percepts of physically colorless objects. This invention allows us to 
identify and interact with objects and the world far more richly than we otherwise 
could. That objects seem to be colored is an invention of natural selection, which 
built into some species, including our own, the specialized neural circuitry 
involved. (Cosmides and Tooby 1995: xi) 
Barry Maund defines colour properties as qualitative properties, or ‘qualia’. 
These properties are subjective, intrinsic features of experiences although the 
subject does not take them to be features of the experiences. Instead, they are taken 
to be properties of physical objects: we project colours onto physical objects. 
(Maund 2011) A similar view has been argued for by Paul Boghossian and J. David 
Velleman (1989/1997) who take colours to be intrinsic properties of a ‘visual field’, 
which are projected onto external objects. Galen Strawson defines colour-aswe-see-
it as a ‘phenomenological property of experience’ (forthcoming). He says ‘colour 
properties are essentially phenomenal properties, i.e.properties whose whole and 
essential nature can be fully revealed in sensory experience given only the 
qualitative (experiential) character that that experience has’ (Strawson 2008: 96). 
In denying that colours are properties of objects, these philosophers have (in 
Shoemaker’s words) ‘kicked them upstairs into the mind’ (Shoemaker 2003). 
However, it is possible to deny that colours are properties of physical objects 
without locating them in the mind. J. L. Mackie and Adam Pautz regard colour 
properties as intentional, or abstract, objects (Mackie 1976; Pautz 2006). Pautz 
claims that colour properties do exist, but nothing instantiates them – they are 
always uninstantiated: 
There are colors, and we are in some sense related to them in color experience; 
but there are no colored things. Color properties only live in the contents of our 
experiences. (2006: 39) 
The main reason philosophers object to eliminativism seems to be that it convicts 
ordinary perception of a radical error: our experience of a world of coloured objects 
turns out to be some kind of illusion. Of course, it is unlikely that eliminativists will 
be swayed by this objection; they are motivated by scientific evidence and readily 
accept that our common-sense, intuitive view must be rejected. 
However, it seems to me that there is a stronger criticism we can make of the 
versions of eliminativism we have considered. Remember, the motivation behind 
eliminativism is that colour properties (understood according to our common-sense 
conception) are not scientifically respectable. We do not need to appeal to such 
properties to explain colour vision, and we should only posit properties that science 
can accommodate. It therefore seems somewhat counterproductive to conclude 
from the scientific rejection of colour properties as properties of objects that colours 
are experiential/ qualitative/ phenomenological properties, or intentional/ abstract 
objects – for it is arguable that such things fall outside the remit of our best science 
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in the same way that colours as properties of objects fall outside this remit.6 Of 
course, this is not a decisive objection; we may think that the properties posited by 
eliminativists are required to explain colour experiences once colours have been 
banished from the surfaces of objects, notwithstanding their dubious metaphysical 
credentials. 
A further point to note – since the eliminativist philosophers discussed so far do 
not in fact eliminate colour properties tout court, they merely eliminate colours qua 
properties of physical objects, we may think that the name ‘eliminativism’ is rather 
misleading.7 Eliminativists seem to be in the business of relocating colour properties 
rather than eliminating them. With this in mind, there is one last eliminativist view 
I will consider that we might think of as ‘strong eliminativism’ – this is the view 
that colour properties do not exist at all: they are not mental properties, and they are 
not intentional or abstract objects. 
Strong eliminativists deny that we need to posit colour properties in order to 
explain colour experiences. Consider this quotation from Larry Hardin’s well-
known defence of eliminativism: 
Colored objects are illusions, but not unfounded illusions. We are normally in 
chromatic perceptual states, and these are neural states… [W]e are to be 
eliminativists with respect to color as a property of objects, but reductivists with 
respect to color experiences (1988: 111–112). 
Hardin’s use of empirical data from scientific studies into how colour experiences 
are realised by neural processes makes room for an ontological reduction of colour 
experiences, without requiring that colour properties be properties of those neural 
processes or, indeed, properties of anything at all.8 
Even though eliminativism is still the dominant position amongst contemporary 
scientists working on colour vision, many philosophers have reacted against the 
view and have attempted to get colour properties back into the world. There are 
three main realist views: physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism. 
4. Physicalism 
According to the physicalist, colours are objective, physical properties of objects – 
surface reflectances, for example9 (Armstrong 1987; Byrne and Hilbert 2003; 
Jackson 1996; McLaughlin 2003; Tye 2000). (An object’s reflectance property is 
the proportion of light that it reflects at each wavelength in the visible spectrum.) If 
experienced colour shades correlated well with particular surface reflectance 
properties, then physicalism would be a reasonably attractive position. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case – the existence of metamers quickly presents a 
challenge to the physicalist view. Metamers are two or more different surface 
reflectance properties that appear to us to be exactly the same colour in some 
conditions. As a response to the metamer challenge, physicalists have claimed that 
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a specific colour shade is a disjunction of surface reflectances (Smart 1997), a type 
of surface reflectance (Byrne and Hilbert 1997a) or a higher-order property of 
having one or another surface reflectance property (Tye personal communication). 
But this is already a rather undesirable complication to the physicalist’s account.10 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that there seems to be no perceiver-
independent way of specifying the disjunction of surface reflectance properties to 
which a particular colour shade is to be reduced. The different surface reflectance 
properties involved bear no intrinsic resemblance to each other; they form a 
disjunction simply because of the colour experiences they cause in perceivers. 
Although this doesn’t make colours mind-dependent properties, they are certainly 
anthropocentric properties on this account. This leads to another worry: we tend to 
think that colours stand in certain similarity relations to each other (blue is more 
similar to purple than it is to yellow, for example) and yet the anthropocentrically 
defined disjunctive properties provided by the physicalist do not seem able to 
preserve this claim. (See Maund 2011. See Byrne and Hilbert 1997a for a response. 
Also, see Davies forthcoming.) 
Additional worries arise when we consider some interesting scientific facts about 
colour perception. For example, a particular surface will look to be different colours 
to us depending upon the lighting conditions and its surroundings. The same 
Munsell colour chip11 will appear to be lighter when placed on a black background 
and darker when placed on a white background. The same chip will also appear to 
be different shades depending upon the colours surrounding it. (See Hardin 1988 
for examples of these kinds.) Alex Byrne and David Hilbert (2004) and Michael 
Tye (2000) defend colour physicalism from this objection. They claim that these 
simultaneous contrast effects are illusions and cannot be used to show that objects 
do not have objective, mind-independent colours. After all, we do not conclude from 
the Müller-Lyer illusion that length is not an objective, intrinsic property of the line, 
and we should not conclude from contrast effects that colour is not an objective, 
intrinsic property of the chip. However, there is an important difference between 
the two cases: we have independent methods of measuring the two Müller-Lyer 
lines, yet we have no independent way of establishing the ‘real’ colour of a 
particular colour chip. We seem to have no way of identifying which surrounding 
allows us to see the colour as it ‘really is’.12 
A similar problem is generated by thinking about the visual systems of other 
species. Human beings are trichromats (we have three types of retinal cone cell) 
whereas most other mammals are dichromats, and some birds and insects are 
tetrachromats. It is reasonable to assume that the colour experiences we human 
beings enjoy when perceptually related to a particular object will be very different 
from those enjoyed by birds, and by other mammals. According to the physicalist, 
having one or another surface reflectance property just is what it is for an object to 
be a particular colour, so if two species are looking at the same object but have 
different colour experiences, then one species has to be wrong. Of course, the 
physicalist can simply stipulate that one or another of the species gets the colour 
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wrong (Tye 2000). But this seems to miss the point of the objection. Given the fact 
that we are all equally products of the process of evolution by natural selection, it 
would be unashamedly anthropocentric to think that we alone get the colours of 
objects right. Moreover, given the variety of animal visual systems, it seems very 
unlikely, statistically, that we are the lucky species. (See Shoemaker 1994, 2000; 
Tye 2000; Bradley and Tye 2001; Byrne and Hilbert 2004 for further discussion.) 
It is not only interspecies variation that presents a challenge for the colour 
physicalist. The same surface reflectance can appear to be different colours to 
different people. What seems unique blue to John can seem greenish-blue to Jane.13 
This problem has generated a series of exchanges between physicalist philosophers 
offering solutions to this puzzle and criticisms of these solutions (see Tye 2006a, 
2006b, 2007; Byrne and Hilbert 2007; Cohen et al. 2006). 
Physicalists encounter many of the problems we have looked at in virtue of 
defending two of our common-sense criteria – the idea that colours are objective 
features of properties, and exclusion: the idea that an object can only ‘really be’ one 
colour (all over, at a time). Despite this attempt to preserve certain features of our 
common-sense account, the physicalist’s analysis of colours as anthropocentrically 
defined disjunctions of surface reflectance properties (in ideal lighting and surround 
conditions) seems a far remove from our common-sense conception of colour. 
5. Dispositionalism 
Dispositionalism originated with the secondary-quality view advocated by Locke, 
who said: 
Such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers 
to produce various Sensations in us by their primary qualities, that is, by the Bulk, 
Figure, Texture, and Motion of their insensible parts, as Colours, Sounds, Tastes, 
and so forth. These I call secondary qualities. (Locke 1689: II, VIII, §10) 
Dispositionalists hold that colours are (to simplify) dispositions to cause certain 
kinds of experiences in perceivers (Peacocke 1997; Johnston (with reservations) 
1997; Levin 2000; McGinn 1983). The claim is often expressed in terms of standard 
perceivers in standard conditions. This allows dispositionalists to uphold 
‘exclusion’ since a particular surface will only ‘really’ have one colour (all over, at 
a time). If to standard perceivers in standard conditions an object is disposed to look 
red, then the object is ‘really’ red (even if it looks to be other colours in other 
situations or to non-standard perceivers). However, specifying who is to qualify as 
a standard perceiver and which conditions count as standard proves to be a difficult 
task. 
We saw in our discussion of physicalism that we have good reasons for thinking 
that different species have different colour experiences when viewing the same 
object, and there seems to be no legitimate way of deciding which species sees the 
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colours objects really have. Our decision over which conditions count as standard 
looks to be equally arbitrary – should we choose direct sunlight or shade? Should 
we choose morning, midday or afternoon light?14 (See Hardin 1988, 2003 for 
discussion.) Dispositionalists can modify their account so that an object is red if it 
is disposed to look red to certain kinds of perceiver in a particular situation. This is 
to abandon exclusion and embrace colour pluralism – the same object will have 
dispositions to look a number of different colours depending on the perceiver and 
the viewing conditions. (See Kalderon 2007 and Matthen 1999. I will consider 
problems with colour pluralism in Section six.) 
Jonathan Cohen’s relationalist view offers an extreme solution to the problem of 
specifying standard perceivers and conditions. He claims that colours are relational 
properties; an object is ‘green for subject S in condition C1’ and so on. (See Cohen 
2009 for a detailed defence of this account. And see Averill 1992 for another 
relationalist account.) I mention this view here because Cohen claims that 
dispositionalism is a version of relationalism (Cohen 2010). In fact, these positions 
are quite different. It is true that dispositions are specified relationally – colours are 
specified with reference to perceivers – but dispositions are not ordinarily thought 
of as metaphysically relational properties. For example, we tend to think that a sugar 
cube would be soluble even if there was no water and so no way for the sugar to 
manifest this disposition. This is not a purely terminological point; if we think that 
dispositions are relational properties, then we will classify dispositionalism as a 
subjectivist account (see Maund 2012 and McGinn 1996). If we think they are non-
relational, then dispositionalism will be an objectivist account. And, of course, it is 
only if the second option is taken that colours will qualify as objective properties of 
objects on this view. 
According to the dispositionalist, an object is red if it is disposed to look red to 
standard perceivers in standard conditions. This seems straightforwardly circular, 
although philosophers disagree over whether or not the circularity is vicious. (See 
McGinn 1996, Boghossian and Velleman 1989/1997 and Byrne and Hilbert 2011.) 
Christopher Peacocke takes the criticism seriously and introduces the term red’ (a 
sensational property of the visual field) to replace the term red on the right hand 
side of the biconditional. (Peacocke 1984/1997) Boghossian and Velleman argue 
that Peacocke’s account is phenomenologically inadequate since the property red’ 
is not attributed to objects on his model, and yet the phenomenology of colour 
perception is naively realistic. Indeed, the general claim that colour properties are 
dispositional properties has been criticised for being incompatible with the 
phenomenology of our colour experiences. After all, colours don’t seem to be 
dispositional properties. (See Cohen 2010 for a response to phenomenology-based 
objections on behalf of the dispositionalist.) 
A related difficulty concerns whether it makes sense to say that we can see 
dispositions; after all, colours are supposed to be visiblia. If we cannot see 
dispositions, and colours are dispositions, then we cannot see colours (McGinn 
1996). Cohen concedes there may be a problem with the idea of seeing dispositional 
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properties in general, but because the dispositions involved in the colour case have 
visual experiences as their manifestations, the problem is surmounted (Cohen 
2010). He claims that this is in the spirit of John McDowell’s response: 
What would one expect it to be like to experience something’s being such as to 
look red, if not to experience the thing in question (in the right circumstances) as 
looking, precisely, red? (McDowell 1985: 112). 
A further worry arises if seeing involves a causal relation to what is seen, for it 
seems the causal relation will be between the perceiver and the categorical base of 
the dispositional property. If this is true, it would mean that colours are not causally 
involved in our seeing objects as coloured.15 Identifying colours with the categorical 
base itself would be to abandon dispositionalism in favour of physicalism or 
primitivism. 
Like physicalism, dispositionalism provides us with an account of colour 
properties which is quite unlike our common-sense conception. As such, I think a 
case can be made for the idea that physicalism and dispositionalism may not, strictly 
speaking, qualify as realist positions. After all, when we ask whether colour 
properties really exist, we want to find out whether Augustinian colours, or colours-
as-we-see-them exist; that is, we want to find out whether there are properties that 
satisfy our ordinary conception of colour properties. And on this issue, the 
physicalist and dispositionalist can agree with the eliminativist: colours-as-we-see-
them do not exist. What does exist (according to these views) is either an 
anthropocentrically demarcated disjunction of surface reflectance properties or a 
disposition to cause certain experiences in rather specific kinds of perceivers in very 
particular situations.16 
It is telling that an eliminativist, who denies that physical objects possess colour 
properties, could agree that they possess the kinds of properties picked out by these 
so-called realist views. This suggests that the dispute between eliminativism and 
these forms of realism is terminological: the disagreement is over which kinds of 
properties get to be called ‘colours’. Indeed, Locke, who is considered to be one of 
the first dispositionalists, is quite explicit about being an eliminativist about colours-
as-we-see-them and a dispositionalist when it comes to explaining the causes of our 
colour experiences. (See Mackie 1976 for discussion.) The only account which 
endorses realism with respect to colours-as-we-see-them is primitivism. 
6. Primitivism 
On this view, colours are simple, non-relational, non-reducible, non-physical, 
qualitative properties of objects (Campbell 1993/1997; Gert 2008; McGinn 1996, 
2000). Campbell calls his primitivist position the ‘Simple View’ since he believes 
it represents our common-sense conception of colour. Indeed, primitivists tend to 
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assume that their view should be the default position in virtue of its compatibility 
with common – sense. 
Now, eliminativists agree that primitivism captures our common-sense 
conception of colour properties; they simply deny that any such properties exist. 
According to our best scientific theories, the only properties that objects possess 
that are causally involved in our having the colour experiences we do are those 
properties that determine the specific wavelengths of light that reach our eyes. This 
fact generates the causal problem for primitivism. Specifically, we would have the 
colour experiences we have when in perceptual contact with objects regardless of 
whether these objects possess primitive colour properties in addition to their 
physical properties. (See Pautz 2006 and Chalmers 2006 for related, evolution-
based arguments against primitivism.) 
There are two possible moves for the primitivist to make in response to this 
challenge: either they can endorse causal overdetermination and claim that primitive 
colour properties are also part of the causal explanation for our colour experiences 
or they can retreat to epiphenomenalism. 
Besides the well-known problems concerning the general plausibility of 
overdetermination, which I won’t rehearse here, there are worries particular to 
primitivism that arise if the first option is taken. If the relevant physical properties 
and the primitive colour properties are independent, then it seems an object could 
possess whatever physical properties required to cause a red experience in subject 
S in circumstance C but also have the primitive colour property green. In such a 
case (if we accept causal overdetermination), the perceiver would have to perceive 
the object in question as being, simultaneously, both red and green. 
Primitivists can say that colour properties supervene on the microphysical 
properties that scientists use in their causal explanation of colour vision. (See 
McGinn 1996 for another version of the supervenience thesis). Peter Hacker seems 
to hold this kind of view. He argues that colour properties can appear in causal 
explanations of colour vision even though another explanation can be given in 
purely physical terms. The two kinds of explanation can coexist without rivalry in 
the same way that explanations involving ‘solidity’ can coexist with explanations 
involving the microphysical supervenience base of solidity (Hacker 1987). 
Unfortunately, this analogy does not hold. Although we may allow a duality at 
the level of explanation, we do not think that the property of solidity is ontologically 
distinct from microphysical structure – at the ontological level, we think that the 
solidity of an object just is its microphysical structure. Consequently, this is not a 
case of genuine causal overdetermination. Colour properties are, according to the 
primitivist, non-physical properties – they are ontologically distinct from the 
physical properties of the object. If they are to be causally responsible for our colour 
experiences, then this will involve a genuine (hence problematic) sense of 
overdetermination. 
Epiphenomenalism seems a likely outcome. Of course, this is to accept that 
primitive colour properties are not causally involved with our seeing objects as 
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coloured. Consequently, if seeing is a causal process, then primitivists would have 
to say that we never actually see colours (Bradley and Tye 2001). Of course, the 
eliminativist also denies that we ever see colours, and I do not want to suggest that 
this is problematic in itself. However, primitivism claims to preserve our common-
sense view of colour properties, and so, the idea that colour properties are not 
causally involved with our seeing objects as coloured is particularly damaging for 
the primitivist. 
Like physicalists and dispositionalists, primitivists rely on the idea of ‘standard 
perceivers and standard conditions’ in the attempt to preserve ‘exclusion’: the claim 
that a particular surface can only ‘really’ be one colour (all over at a time). The fact 
that there seems to be no non-arbitrary way of doing this is therefore as much of a 
problem for primitivism as it is for the other realist views. Given the number of 
different visual systems that do in fact exist (across species) and the innumerable 
possible visual systems that could have evolved, there seems to be no justification 
in thinking that we ever see the colours that objects ‘really’ have. One option is to 
reject exclusion and embrace colour pluralism – the view that a particular surface 
can be different colours (all over at a time). 
Adopting colour pluralism may seem to be a way of allowing that we do see the 
colours that objects really have; however, we immediately face the reverse problem 
– it is difficult to make sense of the idea that we ever get an object’s colour wrong. 
Given the number of different existing (and possible) visual systems, the pluralist 
will have to claim that every object instantiates every colour property (Pautz 2006). 
If this is the case, it seems that we can never see an object as having a colour 
property it does not, in fact, possess.17 
Mark Kalderon claims that his pluralist account can accommodate the 
misperception of colour properties (in colour contrast effects at least) by appealing 
to the fact that there are more and less favourable situations for our particular visual 
systems (Kalderon 2007). However, this manoeuvre locates the error in an unusual 
place: if every object instantiates every primitive colour property, then the reason 
for our error is not (as we might be inclined to think) that the object is not really the 
colour we perceive it as being; instead, the error is due to the suboptimal working 
of our own visual system. 
In any case, I think there is a more worrying consequence of the idea that every 
object instantiates every primitive colour property; namely, this entails that there 
are no colour differences between objects. It is true to say of every object that it is 
red, yellow, green and so on. If primitivists take the pluralist route, the view 
certainly loses its status as the common-sense account of colour properties. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
We have seen that whether a view counts as a realist view of colour properties 
depends on what concept of colour we are working with. If we ask whether there 
are properties that satisfy our common-sense conception, the eliminativist will 
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respond in the negative. However, it seems to me that the dispositionalist, the 
relationalist and the physicalist must also respond in the negative, since their 
accounts do not provide us with colour properties that qualify as ‘colours-as-we-
seethem’. There is, therefore, some common ground amongst eliminativism and 
these views – and in this respect, they all stand together in opposition to primitivism. 
On the other hand, there is some common ground between eliminativism and 
primitivism since both views agree that we should define colour properties as 
‘colours-as-we-see-them’. On this point, eliminativism and primitivism stand 
together in opposition to the other (socalled) realist views that all give an alternative 
conceptualisation of what colour properties are and base their subsequent realism 
on the claim that these properties (dispositional properties, relational properties or 
disjunctions of surface reflectance properties) really do exist. 
Another interesting point arises from this discussion. Eliminativism arose through 
a consideration of what science has to tell us about the kinds of properties we can 
correctly attribute to physical objects. Now, some philosophers may think that we 
should not let science dictate what properties are real (this seems to be an idea that 
motivates Hacker, for example). And yet, our discussion of primitivism suggests 
that the eliminativist’s appeal to science is unnecessary – there might indeed be 
scientifically motivated reasons for considering colour properties to be problematic, 
but the difficulty with locating colour in the external world arises within our 
common-sense framework itself. 
If we return to the rough list of criteria we might think are integral to our concept 
of colour, this becomes apparent. It is part of our everyday experience that the very 
same object can appear to be quite different colours depending on the lighting 
conditions, even though there is no change to the intrinsic properties of the object. 
We know that we have no way of deciding which colour is the ‘real’ colour of the 
object in question and no clear conception of what would count as ‘normal 
conditions’, yet surprisingly, this does not prevent us from believing that the object 
really is a particular colour. Our objectivist attitude towards colour properties also 
seems to conflict with another feature of our everyday thinking about colour. Even 
as young children, we sometimes wonder whether different people have different 
colour experiences when looking at the same object, without wondering whether we 
(or other people) get the colours of objects wrong. If we were consistent objectivists, 
then we would interpret the idea that we may see colours differently from each other 
as entailing that some of us may see colours incorrectly. 
It may sound implausible to claim that there are internal inconsistencies within 
our commonsense view of colour; after all, surely this would be obvious to us. And 
why did eliminativism only become popular after it was argued that there is a clash 
between common sense and science? These are interesting questions, and I can only 
offer a tentative response: we evolved colour experiences because they are 
incredibly useful for navigating the world, and since the internal inconsistencies we 
have identified do not prevent colour experiences from performing this function, 
they simply go unnoticed. 
Colour 
12 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye for awakening my interest 
in colour, and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments. 
1 Kant also defends this position when he says: ‘colours are not properties of the bodies to the intuition of 
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statements, though they make me know truths about the colour, do not make me know the colour itself better than I 
did before: so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the 
colour perfectly and completely when I see it and no further knowledge of it itself is even theoretically possible’ 
(Russell 1912: 47). 
4 See Johnston (1992/1997) for another set of criteria for identifying our everyday conception of colour 
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5  It is not only to physical objects that we ascribe colour properties – we also see liquids, gases, films and 
light-emitting sources as possessing colour properties. However, our explanation for why we see these things as 
coloured will only appeal to the scientifically respectable physical properties that are responsible for the kinds of light 
that reach our eyes. 
6 This objection cannot be avoided by claiming that experiential/qualitative/phenomenological properties 
are in fact identical to neural properties, since we do not want to say that our neural processes are red, yellow, blue 
and so on. 
7   Perhaps ‘Augustinian colour eliminativism’ would be a more appropriate name. 
8   Much of Hardin’s work seems to be in the spirit of the view I have called ‘strong eliminativism’. However, 
in his 1994, he uses the phrase: ‘the colors that we actually see’ (1994: 505), which suggests that he believes that 
colour properties do in fact exist. Exegetical issues aside, it seems to me that strong eliminativism is a promising 
view, worthy of further development. We can be realists about colour experiences – they are neural states/processes 
– whilst denying that colours are properties of anything at all. 9 The colour properties of liquids, films, light-emitting 
sources and so on will need to be given a different reductive analysis. 
10  The claim that colours are causally involved in our colour experiences becomes more difficult to uphold if 
colours are disjunctions of surface reflectance properties since it is unclear whether disjunctive properties have causal 
powers. 
11 The Munsell colour system is a system for classifying colours according to hue, value (lightness) and 
chroma (purity/ saturation). See www.munsell.com. 
12 See Hardin (2003) for a detailed analysis of the problems contrast effects cause for the physicalist 
account. 
13 The idea that different people might enjoy different colour experiences whilst looking at the same object 
in the same conditions originated with Locke’s inverted spectrum thought-experiment. See Locke (1689/1975: II, 
xxxii, 15). 
14 This is also a problem for the physicalist view. 
15 As I mentioned in footnote 6, a similar problem may arise for the physicalist account. The causally 
relevant property in colour perception is the particular surface reflectance property of the object in question, not the 
disjunctive property of having a type of surface reflectance property. We may be sceptical about whether disjunctive 
properties can have causal powers at all. 
16 It is sometimes difficult to establish whether a proposal for the reduction of a property deemed ontologically 
problematic is a genuine reduction or whether the analysis offered takes us so far away from our ordinary conception 
of the property in question that the reduction in fact constitutes an elimination. This is often an issue in philosophy of 
mind. For example, ‘qualia’ (qualitative properties) are sometimes defined in such a way that any physicalist view 
must be eliminativist about them (when qualia are defined as necessarily non-physical, for example). Even though 
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dispositionalists and physicalists present themselves as reductionists rather than eliminativists, I suggest that the 
conception of colour we end up with on these views is so far removed from our ordinary conception that they may be 
better classified as eliminativist. 
17 Other realist views besides primitivism can endorse pluralism. See Jackson and Pargetter (1987/1997) for 
a physicalist account with pluralist sympathies. 
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